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he December 1783 issue of the Berlinische Monatsschrift [Berlin Monthly] 
carried a response by the clergyman Johann Friedrich Zöllner to an 
anonymous article, published in the journal a few months earlier, that 
questioned whether the participation of clergy was necessary at marriage 
ceremonies. Zöllner took issue with the proposal, arguing that it would 
further corrupt public morality at the very moment when “the most horrible 
blasphemies are spoken with smiles,” when libertinism ran rampant, when “French 
charlatanry” threatened to choke off whatever patriotic sentiments still remained, and 
when — “in the name of enlightenment [Aufklärung]”  — much confusion had been 
wrought in the hearts and minds of the citizenry.  This confusion, in Zöllner’s view, 
extended to the very notion of enlightenment itself. So he inserted a footnote in his essay 
that asked:  
What is enlightenment?  This question, which is almost as important as 
what is truth, should indeed be answered before one begins to 
enlighten!  And still I have never found it answered!1 
His query unleashed a flood of answers. Within a year the Berlinische Monatsschrift had 
published responses to the question by both Moses Mendelssohn and Immanuel Kant.2  
The debate quickly spread to other journals as other writers joined the discussion.3 By 
1790 answers to Zöllner’s question had proliferated to the point where a review article in 
the Deutsche Monatsschrift [German Monthly] catalogued twenty-one different meanings 
of the term and concluded that the word had become so divorced from any clear 
conventions of usage that the discussion of the concept had degenerated into “a war of all 
against all” between combatants who marshaled their own idiosyncratic definitions.4  
While Zöllner’s question has continued to provoke discussion down to the present 
day, its contemporary answers have, with one notable exception, faded into obscurity.  
The exception, of course, is Immanuel Kant’s response.  The opening lines of his 
contribution to the discussion continue to be invoked whenever there is a need to define, 
discuss, or dismiss the Enlightenment: 
Enlightenment is mankind’s exit from its self-incurred immaturity.  
Immaturity is the inability to make use one’s own understanding 
without the guidance of another.  Self-incurred is this inability if its 
cause lies not in the lack of understanding, but rather in the lack of the 
resolution and the courage to use it without the guidance of another.  
T 
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Sapere aude!  Have the courage to use your own understanding! is thus 
the motto of enlightenment.5 
The ubiquity of these famous lines is, however, not without its problems. 
It is easy to forget that Kant’s answer was but one of many responses to a debate 
that ended inconclusively: Aufklärung designated a great many different, and sometimes 
contradictory, things in the late eighteenth century.  It is also sometimes easy to overlook 
the fact that Kant was answering a somewhat different question than we typically 
understand him to be answering.  His answer is most often cited today as part of an effort 
to characterize a historical period known as “the Enlightenment.” Zöllner, however,  was 
seeking a definition of a process, not an historical period and the ensuing dispute was 
concerned, not with the characteristics of an epoch, but rather with the question of how 
best to define an activity.  The latter question will be the focus of this chapter, which will 
examine some of the differing ways in which the activity of enlightenment was 
understood and practiced in eighteenth-century Germany.   
Any discussion of the German Enlightenment faces one additional problem.  
While the custom of distinguishing “the German Enlightenment” from related 
developments in other parts of Europe can be traced at least as far back as the lectures on 
the history of philosophy that Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel delivered in Berlin in the 
1820s, it bears remembering that this concept, too, is not without its difficulties. During 
the period in question, “German” referred to a linguistic grouping rather than a state.  The 
political entity known as Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation included non-
Germans (e.g., in the Habsburg domains), excluded some German-speaking areas (e.g., in 
the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Alsatia), and was, in any case, politically moribund.  
Its fragmentation had resulted in a host of smaller territorial units and, as a result, a 
number of settings in which different German enlightenments developed.6  It is also 
worth stressing that the German Enlightenment did not develop in isolation from 
developments in the rest of Europe.7  Germans were acquainted with the central texts of 
the broader European Enlightenment both in the translation and in the original. Important 
representatives of the French Enlightenment spent time in Frederick II’s court in Potsdam 
and occupied positions in the Berlin Academy.  German enlighteners journeyed to other 
parts of Europe and were influenced by what they encountered during their travels.  The 
idea that there was something called the “Republic of Letters,” a cosmopolitan 
community of readers and writers, was not merely an idle dream.  
The first section will offer a brief sketch of the shifting philosophical influences 
that defined the period.   The second will discuss how these conceptions of enlightenment 
were put into practice, focusing particularly on how enlightenment came to be defined in 
opposition to prejudice, superstition, and fanaticism.  The third section will examine the 
relationship between enlightenment and religious faith, while the fourth section will focus 
on discussion of the question of whether, in order to preserve public order, it might be 
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necessary to set limits on the spread of enlightenment.  The final section will explore the 
differing ways in which the notion of toleration, that most important of all enlightenment 
values, was understood. 
 
 
I. Enlightenment in Theory:  The Philosophical Background 
 
The German Enlightenment is usually seen as falling into two broad phases.8  The 
first stretches from Christian Thomasius’ first German lectures in 1688 to the death of 
Christian Wolff in 1754.  The beginning of the period was marked by heated conflicts 
between disciples of these two thinkers, who have been viewed as establishing different, 
and indeed rival, conceptions of enlightenment.9  The second period commences around 
the middle of the century, with the gradual weakening of the influence of Wolff’s 
philosophy – which had become the dominant tradition in most universities – in the years 
prior to his death.  It is marked by a variety of attempts, both by those who had still 
maintained a loyalty to Wolff’s system and by those who rejected it, to respond to the 
recent work of French, English, and Scottish philosophers. This period is usually seen as 
ending with the publication of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and with 
the ensuing debates over the implications of Kant’s philosophical revolution.  While such 
periodizations are unavoidably schematic, they drive home one important point: 
eighteenth-century German thought was marked by a number of diverging and often 
conflicting philosophical tendencies.  It also helps to explain why, at the close of the 
period, there could be such a wide range of views with regard to the question of just 
what, exactly, the activity of enlightenment involved. 
Disagreements about the true nature of enlightenment were, in many respects, 
present from the very start of the period in the contrasting approaches of the two figures 
who dominated the first phase of the German Enlightenment:  Christian Thomasius 
(1655-1728) and Christian Wolff (1679-1754). Best known today for treatises on natural 
law that drew on the work of Hobbes and Pufendorf to provide a non-theological 
grounding for political authority, Thomasius’ career was distinguished by wide-ranging 
efforts at educational and cultural reform that were aimed, in large part, at producing the 
group of politically-trained civil servants needed to administer the new territorial states 
that began to emerge in wake of the Treaty of Westphalia. The point of departure for 
much of his project lay in the critique of what he termed “prejudices” [praejudicium ], 
those “false opinions” that stem from an uncritical acceptance of authorities or a haste in 
drawing conclusions.  In both his lectures at the University of Halle (the first modern 
Protestant German university) and in his journal Monatgespräche (one of the first 
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monthly journals to appear in German), he mounted a series of attacks on religious 
intolerance, witchcraft trials, torture, and the other prejudices of the day.11  
Thomasius defined prejudice broadly enough to include the Scholastic 
metaphysical systems that had played a dominant role in traditional university education.  
Against the academic philosophy of the “schools,” he sought to lay the foundations for a 
“civil” or “court” philosophy that rejected Descartes’ call for a complete suspension of 
belief and instead embraced an approach – combining elements from modern natural law 
theory, classical Epicureanism, and recent strands of Protestant theology – that 
Thomasius himself characterized as “eclectic.”   The body of work that resulted could be 
put to variety of uses. His distinction between revealed and natural knowledge could be 
coupled with his rejection of Scholastic metaphysics to foster the growth of approaches to 
politics that were distinguished by their “empiricist” or “instrumentalist” cast.  At the 
same time, nothing in his rejection of metaphysical and rationalist theology was opposed 
to the religious tradition known as Pietism, a reform movement within Protestantism in 
which the faithful joined together in small groups (the collegia pietatis) that were devoted 
to the reading of Scripture, prayer, moral reflection, and philanthropic ventures. 12 
Wolff, in contrast, was inspired in the construction of his philosophical system by 
Descartes, Malebranche, and Spinoza and his approach became inseparably linked with 
that of Leibniz (with whom he had corresponded on mathematical questions) when the 
term “Leibniz-Wolff philosophy” was coined by one of his students.13  Between 1712 and 
1723 he published a series of German works on a wide-range of philosophical subjects, 
all of them framed in the rigorously deductive form of Spinoza’s more geometrico, a 
method that he saw as the surest means of inoculating philosophy against the intrusion of 
dogmatic prejudices and thus securing its status as a foundational discipline, distinct from 
theology.14  His work met with considerable resistance from Pietist disciples of 
Thomasius at Halle, who were repelled by his application of philosophical methods to 
what they regarded as matters of faith and who argued that Wolff’s system, by producing 
a comprehensive account of the rationality of the world, culminated in a completely 
determinist system that left no room for the  freedom of the will. A public lecture 
delivered by Wolff in 1721 that used Confucian morality as an illustration of the 
possibility of deriving sound moral principles through the use of human reason unaided 
by supernatural revelation provided the impetus for a cabinet order from the Prussian 
monarch Frederick William I demanding, under the threat of death, that Wolff surrender 
his position and leave Prussia.15  Wolff found refuge at the University of Marburg, and 
went on to gain a reputation throughout Europe with a series of Latin works that revisited 
and expanded on the themes of his earlier German publications. When Frederick II 
ascended to the throne in 1740, he signaled his more liberal attitude towards 
philosophical disputes by inviting Wolff to return.   
Even before Wolff’s triumphant return to Prussia, his philosophy had become a 
dominant force, not only within German universities, but also in German intellectual and 
cultural life.  One example of his influence can be seen in the Société des Aléthophiles 
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[The Society of Friends of Truth], a group of churchmen, lawyers, and civil servants 
dedicated to the dissemination of truth in general, and the philosophy of Leibniz and 
Wolff in particular, that met at the Berlin home of Ernst Christoph von Manteuffel during 
the 1730s. 16  The statutes of the group directed its members to apply the principles of 
Wolff’s philosophy to their own conduct:  “Hold nothing as true, hold nothing as false,” 
read one of the rules of the society, “so long as you have been convinced of it by no 
sufficient reason [zureichenden Grund].”17 Further evidence of the spread of Wolffian 
ideas can be see in the medal the group had struck in 1736, which depicts the head of 
Minerva, the goddess of wisdom, with the heads of the philosophers Leibniz and Wolff 
peaking out from the feathers of her helmet.  Over the top of the medal are the words of 
the Latin poet Horace, Sapere Aude!  [“Dare to be wise!”] – a phrase that Kant would 
himself hail, in his answer to the question “What is enlightenment?,” as “the motto of 
enlightenment.”18 
It had been Frederick’s intention to name Wolff to the Royal Academy in Berlin, 
which had been established in 1700, in large part through the efforts of Leibniz, but 
which had become moribund after Leibniz’s death in 1716. Wolff, however, preferred to 
return to his previous position at Halle and Frederick wound up bringing the French 
scientist Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis to Berlin. As disciple of Newton and Locke, 
Maupertuis was an empiricist in his orientation and hence generally critical Wolff’s 
rationalist approach, which was represented within the Academy by Samuel Formey, its 
perpetual secretary. From the middle of the 1750s onward a series of prize questions – 
often formulated in consultation with Frederick who, in turn, corresponded with 
d’Alembert regarding possible topics – served both to secure the fame of the Academy 
throughout Europe and to focus attention on some of the central issues in dispute between 
the Academy’s Wolffians and its Newtonians. 19 
By the end of the 1750s, Wolff’s influence on German intellectual life had begun 
to wane.  In a 1759 essay, Moses Mendelssohn observed that just as Descartes had 
expelled scholasticism and Wolff, in turn, had supplanted Descartes, it now appeared that 
Wolff would himself be displaced by Christian August Crusius, perhaps the most skilled 
of Thomasius’ followers. Mendelssohn was a dedicated disciple of Wolff’s approach, 
which he sought to develop in a series of well-received works in the area of aesthetics, 
and his article lamented the “anarchy” that now prevailed among a youth who, freed from 
the discipline that the old metaphysics had provided,  “criticize everything, laugh at 
everything.” Leibniz’s philosophical system, he observed, was now regarded as either “a 
dream or a joke” and Wolff was seen as “an old windbag.”20  In a letter written at the end 
of 1765 Kant offered a similar view of the philosophical landscape but came to a 
somewhat more optimistic conclusion:  the “eternal trifling of punsters and the wearying 
chatter of today’s reputed writers” signaled the “total dissolution that always precedes the 
start of a new creation;” it represented the “euthanasia of erroneous” philosophy that 
prepared the way for “the great, long-awaited revolution in the sciences.”21 
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The style of philosophizing that came into prominence in the years following 
Wolff’s death has come to be known as “Popular Philosophy.”22  An early exposition of 
the idea, Johann August Ernesti’s Rectoral Address from 1754, De Philosophia Populari 
invoked Denis Diderot’s summons, in his recently published Pensées sur l’interpretation 
de la Naturei (1753) to “make philosophy popular.”23 Among the figures who are usually 
viewed as associated with the movement are the writers Johann Jakob Engel, Christoph 
Martin Wieland, and Christian Garve, the publisher Friedrich Nicolai, and the 
philosophers Thomas Abbt, Christoph Meiners, Johann Georg Feder, Johann Georg 
Sulzer, and Moses Mendelssohn.  The general ideal behind the movement echoed 
Thomasius’ critique of the philosophical pedantry of “school philosophy,” but the 
movement was, if anything, even more eclectic than Thomasius in the sources on which it 
drew.  There was a broad emphasis on questions of history, aesthetics, and pedagogy, 
along with an interest in questions involving the relationship of language, thought, and 
culture that was spurred, in part, by prize competitions sponsored by the Berlin 
Academy.24 Popular Philosophers were cosmopolitan in their reading.  Rousseau’s works 
were avidly consumed and quickly translated (Moses Mendelssohn completed a 
translation of the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality in 1756) as were works by 
Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Ferguson, and various representatives of the 
Scottish “Common Sense” school.25  Journals such as Addison and Steele’s Tattler and 
Spectator were widely imitated.  In their style of writing, Popular Philosophers eschewed 
system-building of the sort Wolff had championed in favor of an essayistic style that was 
inspired in large part by the writings of Shaftesbury and Hume. Seeking an audience 
beyond the academy they sought to play the role – to invoke the title of the influential 
journal edited by Engel – of “philosopher for the world.”26 
The “world” which this philosophy addressed was, above all, a world of readers. 
Beginning in the 1760s, there had been a marked increase in the number of publishers 
producing books for the German market and a rise in new journals, including Wieland’s 
Teutscher Merkur (German Mercury), Bole’s Deutsches Museum (German Museum), and 
Nicolai’s Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek (Universal German Library), that attempted to 
keep track of the flood of new publications. 27   Reading practices underwent a significant 
transformation during the period, with a change from so-called “intensive reading” – in 
which readers owned a few books (usually religious in character) that were read again 
and again – to what is known as “extensive reading” – in which readers work their way 
through a number of works. Related to this shift was the emergence of reading societies, 
where individuals would pool their resources and maintain joint subscriptions to books 
and journals.  These societies were but one particular example of the broader network of 
clubs and societies that proliferated during the period, forming what has been broadly 
characterized as the emerging “public sphere.”28  To get a better sense of what 
enlightenment involved in practice, it may be helpful to look more closely at one of the 
most illustrious and influential of these societies:  the Berlin Mittwochsgesellschaft 
[Wednesday Society]. 
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II. Enlightenment in Practice:  the “Friends of Enlightenment” 
 
The Mittwochsgesellschaft was founded in Berlin during the summer of 1783, and 
almost everything about it – including its name – was shrouded in secrecy. 29 It was 
known to the public (to the extent that it was known at all) as the Mittwochsgesellschaft, 
a name that may have been chosen to foster confusion with the “Monday Club,” a literary 
society that had been meeting in the city for a number of years.  Among its members, 
however, it was known by a name that was far more reflective of its interests:  “the 
Friends of Enlightenment.” The obsession with secrecy can be explained in part by the 
group’s having been established in order to explore those delicate political and social 
questions pertaining to “the enlightenment and the welfare of mankind”—including such 
issues as the limits of censorship, possible reforms of the legal code, and the legitimacy 
of aristocratic privileges – that had been excluded from discussion in the Monday Club. 
There was, however, an even more pressing reason for the desire to shield discussions 
from scrutiny: members of the society included some of the leading figures in Berlin’s 
political and intellectual life, including important figures in the Prussian bureaucracy, 
prominent members of the Berlin clergy, and such major figures in Berlin literary and 
intellectual life as Friedrich Nicolai, Johann Jacob Engel, and Moses Mendelssohn. A 
free and open discussion of opinions between its members would be possible only if there 
was an assurance that they would be able to try out new ideas in a sympathetic setting 
before submitting them to scrutiny of others. 
While the fame of its members prevents the group from being viewed as in any 
way typical of the multitude of other societies that flourished during this period, the 
group’s self-conscious devotion to the idea of public enlightenment nevertheless present 
us with a compelling picture of one vision of what enlightenment involved during the 
closing decades of the eighteenth century.  The Mittwochgesellschaft has one additional 
claim on our attention:  its discussions provided the impetus for Zöllner’s question in the 
Berlinische Monatsschrift.  Zöllner was a member of the group, as were the journal’s co-
editors Johann Erich Biester and Friedrich Gedike and was present at meeting of the 
group on the evening of December 17, 1783 when Johann Karl Wilhelm Möhsen, 
Frederick the Great’s personal physician and a scholar with interests in the history of 
science, offered a series of remarks on the topic “What is to be Done toward the 
Enlightenment of the Citizenry.”  His talk was organized around six theses, the first of 
which proposed: “That it be determined more precisely: What is enlightenment?”30   
While Möhnsen did not offer a direct answer to the question, he immediately 
offered a further set of topics for discussion that reveal much about the context in which 
the concept of enlightenment was understood by members of the society.   He proposed 
that his colleagues “determine the deficiencies and the infirmities in the direction of the 
understanding, in the manner of thinking, in the prejudices and in the ethics of our nation 
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… and that we investigate how they have been promoted thus far.”  Once these 
impediments had been determined, it would then be possible to “attack and root out those 
prejudices and errors that are the most pernicious” and to “nurture and propagate those 
truths whose general recognition is most necessary.”31 In juxtaposing enlightenment to 
error and prejudice, Möhsen was drawing on a well-established convention.32  Not only 
had the critique of prejudices served as the point of departure for Thomasius’ lectures on 
the proper use of reason, but models for such a critique could be found both in Francis 
Bacon’s critique of the various “idols” which plagued human understanding and in 
Descartes’ insistence on the need to put aside the preconceived opinions that prevented us 
from seeing matters clearly.33  Of equal importance was the use of the term within 
Protestant controversial literature, where a blind adherence to tradition and to authority 
was seen as preventing individuals from understanding the true message of the scriptures.  
By the time of Möhsen’s lecture, an elaborate vocabulary was in place for distinguishing 
among the various different classes of errors that were alleged to be the cause of much of 
the misery of the human race.     
“Prejudice” [Vorurteil] was the most general, and least inflammatory, of the 
terms.  In its weakest sense – as a preliminary judgment made in the absence of complete 
information – it was seen as inevitable and not particularly threatening.  Its potential 
danger lay in its tendency to foster, especially among the least educated classes, a 
disposition towards “superstition” [Aberglaube] that, in turn, served as the breeding 
ground for that enthusiastic and fanatical form of religious fervor that went by the name 
Schwärmerei – a term whose multiple connotations will be explored below. Discussions 
of the distinctions between prejudice, superstition, and Schwärmerei as well as attempts 
to trace the relationship between them regularly appeared in journals during this period, 
along with articles that documented some of the most egregious examples of their hold on 
the population.  
Superstition [Aberglaube] typically designated one particular class of prejudices:  
those that postulated the presence of supernatural forces at work in the world.  An article 
in the Teutsche Merkur [German Mercury] dating from 1787 appealed to Hobbes and 
Helvetius and traced the origin of superstition to human weakness in the face of nature, a 
weakness that gave rise to primitive religions and a belief in magical practices.34 A 
contributor to the Magazine für Westphalen [Magazine for Westphalia] attributed the 
prevalence of superstition in the countryside to the lack of newspapers and other up-to-
date reading materials.35 In an article on the relationship between prejudice and 
superstition, Zöllner maintained that at least some superstitions (for instance, the notion 
that it was bad luck to fail to crush the shell of a hard-boiled egg) could be traced to 
prejudices that, in fact, might contain sensible rules (in the case of eggshells, the danger 
of transmission of diseases) but which have now become a matter of irrational 
superstition, rather than rational understanding.36  
Superstitions were of particular concern because of their tendency to promote a 
much more dangerous mental state: Schwärmerei, a term that carries connotations of 
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mass and mutual contagion (as in the swarming of bees) as well as frenzied disorder (as 
in the mass violence of the religious wars). Discussions of Schwärmerei were, if 
anything, even more contested than disputes over the meaning of enlightenment, in part 
because of the desire to distinguish it from those more benign form of enthusiasm 
associated with artistic inspiration. 37   However defined, evidence of the ease with which 
individuals could fall prey to such contagion filled the pages of eighteenth-century 
journals.  For example, the August 1783 “Anecdotes” section of the Berlinische 
Monatsschrift reported how, in response to a rumor that Berlin would be destroyed on 
July 11, crowds fled the city. 38  A year later, the same journal reported on the suicides of 
two individuals who left behind notes expressing their confidence that the “Blood of 
Christ makes us free from all sins,” thus suggesting that the decision to take their lives 
had been inspired by a belief in a doctrine of “vicarious and sufficient salvation” that was 
contradicted both by reason and by Scripture.39  In order to demonstrate that “no less than 
religion does medicine have its enthusiasts,” the journal also published a report by the 
state physician Johann Theodor Pyl on the activities of the “Moon Doctor of Berlin” — a 
practitioner of “astral medicine” who, in the years 1780-1781 built a sizable practice by 
treating patients with “moonshine and prayer.”40 
These public campaigns against prejudice, superstition, and Schwärmerei provide 
a glimpse of what enlightenment looked like in practice.  Journals like the Berlinische 
Monatsschrift played a major role in the dissemination of enlightenment, but equally 
significant were the activities of the Berlin clergy. In addition to Zöllner, a number of 
important Berlin clergymen were members of the society, including Johann Joachim 
Spalding, Johann Samuel Diterich, and Wilhelm Abraham Teller, all of whom embraced 
an enlightened approach to theology which argued that, because the central tenants of 
Christian belief could be supported by rational arguments, there could be no contradiction 
between faith and reason.41 In contrast to the Pietist doctrine that mankind’s fallen state 
required a protracted struggle against natural dispositions, Spalding and his colleagues 
reinterpreted Luther’s doctrine of “calling” as the realization of natural dispositions 
towards happiness and improvement through the pursuit of socially useful vocations.  
They viewed the mission of the clergy in these terms as well, stressing their pedagogical 
responsibilities.42  Thus, the campaign against prejudice and superstition that was 
undertaken by the Berlinische Monatsschrift was joined by clergy whose sermons offered 
an interpretation of Scripture that sought to emphasize the civic responsibilities of the 
faithful and to counter the tendencies towards superstition that seem to have been 
particularly rampant among those who had only recently come to Berlin from the 
countryside.43 
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III. Faith and Reason 
The role of the Berlin clergy in the program of the Mittwochsgesellschaft is in 
keeping with what has long been seen as one of the defining features of the German 
Enlightenment:  its relationship with established religious practices was far less 
antagonistic than its French counterpart.  For Hegel, the explanation was simple enough: 
Germany had experienced a successful reformation and France had not.  Whatever its 
shortcomings – among them, its ignoring of the progress of enlightenment in Catholic 
regions of Germany – Hegel’s explanation would likely have been endorsed by a 
substantial number of those who were engaged in the activity of enlightenment in 
Germany.  The clerical members of the Mittwochsgesellschaft saw themselves as carrying 
on a project whose origins could be traced at least to the Reformation.  
One of the more influential examples of the approach such clergy embraced was 
Johann Joachim Spalding’s The Destiny of Man. 44  First published in 1748 it had, by the 
end of the century, gone through thirteen editions and been translated into Latin, French, 
and Dutch. Through a series of reflections on the questions “Why do I exist?” and “What 
should I do?”, the book sought to discover a fundamental rule that could serve to guide 
one’s life.  After examining, and finding lacking, lives that would be devoted solely to the 
satisfaction of physical drives or the pursuit of aesthetic pleasure, the book turned to the 
concept to a life devoted to the pursuit of virtue, which constitutes the first serious 
possibility as a destiny for man.45   Spalding’s discussion of virtue employed a synthesis 
of elements from Wolff’s philosophy (which he had studied intensively at the start of his 
career) with the work of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Butler that was, in many respects, 
typical of the sort of combinations of British and German influences that began to 
proliferate in the middle of the century.  Spalding saw individuals as having an inherent 
disposition to work for the common good of mankind and he argued that this “natural” 
ability to judge matters of right and wrong was, in fact, the “voice of God, the voice of 
eternal truth, which speaks in me.”46  This voice impels us to act to bring about a state of 
happiness that, because of the contingencies of human existence, can never be achieved 
on earth.  Yet the very failure to attain this end in this world suggests the promise of a 
future life wherein “my constrained and beclouded soul will be given so much more light 
and freedom that I will be assured of a complete enlightenment of all the obscure parts of 
the plan by which the world is ruled.”47  This, then, is the ultimate end for which man is 
said to be destined: immortality in the kingdom of God. 
Evidence of the pervasiveness of the book’s influence can be found in Moses 
Mendelssohn’s response to Zöllner’s question, which defined “enlightenment” as one 
aspect of a more general process, termed Bildung [education, formation]. For 
Mendelssohn, the constant point of reference against which the progress of Bildung must 
be measured is the “destiny of man.” This concept, he wrote, is “the point on which we 
must set our eyes, if we do not wish to lose our way.”48 Spalding’s book was, however, 
not without its critics. Early in 1764, Thomas Abbt, a young friend of Mendelssohn who 
had studied philosophy, mathematics, and theology at Halle and had gained early fame 
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with his patriotic treatise On Death for the Fatherland, suggested that the two publicly 
debate the merits of Spalding’s book, whose argument, Abbt wrote, remained “shrouded 
in mystery.”49  Abbt had been influenced both by historical Biblical criticism and by the 
historically informed writings of his friend Justus Möser and his objections— which were 
published, along with Mendelssohn’s defense, in Nicolai’s Literaturbriefe [Letters 
Concerning the Latest Literature] in June and July of 1764— were precisely the sort of 
questions one would expect a more empiricist and historicist reader to raise against 
Spalding’s rationalist reconstruction of Christian faith. 50   He argued that a historically 
informed study of customs and mores would show that — far from being a universal 
“destiny” of mankind — the goals Spalding saw as universal dispositions of the human 
species were, in fact, the particular products of a refined, eighteenth-century 
intelligence.51 
A more oblique response to the approach to religion favored by Spalding and his 
colleagues can be found in the theological writings of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-
1781).52  Lessing came to Berlin in 1748, set on a career as a man of letters, moved into 
the orbit of the publisher Nicolai, and began a life-long friendship with Moses 
Mendelssohn, who had arrived in the city five years earlier as an impoverished student of 
the Talmud.  In 1770, Lessing left the city to take up a post as royal librarian for the Duke 
of Brunswick where, drawing both on material in the library at Wolfenbüttel and on his 
own writings, began a series of publications on religious and theological questions.53 The 
strategy Lessing adopted in his theological writings was a puzzling one. He devoted a 
number of essays to defending arguments of more traditional theologians against the 
enlightened approaches of the sort favored by Spalding and his colleagues. His motive for 
defending orthodoxy was, however,  rather peculiar: he felt that the Berlin theologians 
had offered, in place of a patently absurd set of beliefs, a slightly less absurd construction 
that had the additional disadvantage of being more likely to persist than the traditional 
beliefs they sought to supplant. In a letter from 1777 he wrote: “I only prefer the old 
orthodox theology (at bottom, tolerant) to the new (at bottom, intolerant) because the 
former is in manifest conflict with human reason, whereas the latter might easily take one 
in. I make agreement with my obvious enemies in order to be able to be better on guard 
against my secret adversaries.”54  His plan, in other words, seems to have been to use 
orthodoxy to demolish the enlightened approach to religion that prevailed in Berlin in 
order to prepare the way for a more radical reformulation of religious doctrine, hints of 
which were broached in his major contribution to the philosophy of history, Erziehung 
des Menschengeschlechts [Education of the Human Race] (1777). 
The question of Lessing’s philosophical convictions would become a subject of 
heated debate during the so-called Pantheismusstreit [Pantheism Controversy] that raged 
in years after his death. 55  The controversy began as a dispute between Mendelssohn and 
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi – a young writer and philosopher who was critical of what he 
saw as the Berlin Enlightenment’s one-sided emphasis on reason at the expense of 
sentiment and feeling – over Jacobi’s claim that Lessing had, in a conversation a few 
years before his death, expressed admiration for Goethe’s unpublished (and, in the eyes 
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of many contemporaries, sacrilegious) poem “Prometheus” and rejected “all orthodox 
conceptions of the divinity” in favor of the ancient Greek concept of the “One and All” 
(hen kai pan). When a shocked Jacobi asked whether this did not amount to an allegiance 
to Spinozism,  Lessing allegedly responded, “If I were to name myself after someone, I 
know of no other.”56 
In many respects, Jacobi reiterated the charges that had driven Wolff from Halle 
six decades earlier:   maintained that, despite its claim to be providing a more rational 
basis of religious faith, efforts at enlightenment inevitably culminated in a fatalistic 
determinism that ruled out the possibility of human freedom.  What was novel, however, 
in Jacobi’s critique was that it drew, in part, on many of the same authors from the 
broader European Enlightenment who had been central to the program of Popular 
Philosophy. His reading of Hume and Reid convinced him that reason cannot attain 
certainty about the existence of external objects, and that our experience of such objects 
takes the form of a revelation that is beyond argument and rests on “faith” alone.57  
Carrying this dichotomy between the spheres of faith and knowledge into theology, he 
argued that reason alone can never lead us to certainty of God’s existence.  This, he 
claimed, was the lesson he took from Spinoza.  More relentlessly than any other 
philosopher, Spinoza had sought to provide a complete explanation for the world but 
failed, in Jacobi’s eyes, to account for human freedom — thus revealing what resisted 
reason and had to be taken on faith alone. 
 
IV. The Public Use of Reason 
One of the more important contributions to the Pantheismusstreit was Kant’s 
“What is Orientation in Thinking?,” an essay published in the Berlinische Monatsschrift 
in October 1786.  Written shortly after the death of Frederick II, at a time when anxieties 
were running high among members of the Berlin Enlightenment about the policies likely 
to be adopted by the new monarch, Frederick William II, the essay closed with a defense 
of the freedom of the press that rejected the notion that freedom of the press could be 
viewed as a mere supplement to the more fundamental right to think whatever one 
pleased. “How much and how correctly would we think,” Kant asked,“if we did not think 
as it were in community with others to whom we communicate our thoughts and who 
communicate theirs with us.”58  Kant’s vigorous defense of what he had characterized in 
his answer to Zöllner’s question as the “public use of reason” was one of the more 
important discussions of what had long been a central concern throughout the period:  the 
extent to which individuals had a right to express their convictions. 
In the wake of his forced departure from Halle, Wolff defended “the freedom to 
philosophize,” which he defined as “the permission to state publicly our own opinion on 
philosophical issues.”  To be compelled to adhere to positions contrary to what one 
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believed was nothing less than “philosophical servitude.”59 “Reason,” Wolff insisted, 
“does not allow itself to be ordered about.”60  Yet, even after Frederick had signaled a 
greater tolerance for the open discussion of religious and philosophical questions by 
inviting Wolff to return, the nature and the scope of the freedom of expression in Prussia 
remained controversial.  Indeed, Lessing maintained that the range of topics open to 
discussion in Frederick’s Prussia was, in practice, rather restricted: all it really amounted 
to was a freedom “to make as many idiotic remarks against religion as one wants.” The 
scope of such liberties did not extend to political questions and, contrasting what could be 
said about politics in Prussia with what was being written in Vienna, France, and 
Denmark, Lessing concluded that Frederick ruled over “the most enslaved land in 
Europe.”61 
 When Frederick II assumed the throne in 1740, the responsibility for censorship 
had been distributed throughout a number of departments, each with its own sphere of 
responsibilities. Individual censors had considerable latitude in determining the fate of 
publications and the process by which individual works came before the censor was, at 
best, haphazard.  Frederick initially attempted to reform the system by giving the Berlin 
Academy of Sciences sole responsibility over censorship, but quickly abandoned the 
initiative after it met with resistance both from booksellers (who feared it would increase 
the cost of book production while curtailing the number of books actually published) and 
from the members of the Academy (who were unwilling to take on new responsibilities 
without receiving additional compensation). In 1749 he reverted to the earlier system, 
leaving individual censors with little to guide them in determining whether books 
offended against religion, the state, or morality.62 
The question of the proper scope of censorship played an important role in the 
discussions within the Mittwochgesellschaft spurred by Möhsen’s call for a closer 
consideration of the question “What is enlightenment?”  Mendelssohn was initially rather 
skeptical about the alleged dangers of too much or too rapid an enlightenment of the 
public, a view that was seconded by Nicolai, who argued that “one has more to fear in 
terms of disadvantages to truth and happiness from the smallest restriction than from the 
greatest extension” of the freedom of the press.63  Other members of the society, however, 
counseled greater caution.  The noted jurist Ernst Ferdinand Klein was willing to concede 
that in general, “every truth is useful and every error harmful,” but went on to argue that 
it was necessary to consider the practical impact of ideas on different groups within 
society and suggested that, “for a certain class of men, a certain error can serve to bring 
them to a higher concept of things which are worthy of greater attention.”64   Gedike 
agreed, noting that enlightenment was a “relative” concept that was differentiated 
according to such criteria as “place, time, rank, sex.”65  
The views of Klein and Gedike mirrored what had become the established 
practice during the last years of Frederick’s reign. Censors generally granted the greatest 
latitude to those printed works that were intended for an educated audience.  The chief 
concern was with the potential for social unrest should enlightened ideas spread beyond 
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the sphere of educated readers and writers. The case of the clergyman Johann Heinrich 
Schulz – known to his contemporaries as “Pony-tail Schulz” because of his habit of 
preaching to his congregation without wearing a wig – illustrates the considerations that 
came into play in deciding what sorts of expressions and what sort of conduct could be 
tolerated. 66  What troubled the authorities charged with examining Schulz’s conduct (a 
group that included a number of members of the Mittwochgesellschaft) was less the 
content of his rather heterodox writings than the unconventional style of dress that he 
adopted when addressing his congregation (Schulz had explained the wigs that clergy 
traditionally wore made his head so hot that he became dizzy).  Yet, despite concern that 
his failure to wear a wig might have an unsettling effect on his congregation, Schulz was 
not, in the end, reprimanded.  There was, after all, no law requiring clergy to wear wigs 
and, more generally, the committee investigating Schulz’s conduct seems to have wished 
to avoid having his unconventional dress become a matter for public debate in the print 
media. Schulz went on to survive scrutiny of subsequent, and even more radical, writings 
on religious questions, with Karl Abraham Freiherr von Zedlitz, the head of the Prussian 
Geistliches Departement [Ecclesiastical Department], drawing a clear line between 
Schulz’s written work and his conduct as a clergyman. 
The distinction that von Zedlitz made between Schulz’s views in works that 
addressed the reading public and his conduct as a clergyman, discharging his 
responsibilities toward his own congregation, was echoed in the demarcation that Kant 
proposed, in his answer to Zöllner’s question, between “public” and “private” uses of 
reason. Kant defined the “public” use of reason as the “use which anyone makes of it as a 
scholar [Gelehrter] before the entire public of the reading world.”  He contrasted it to the 
“private” use that individuals make of their reason in those specific civil posts or offices 
that have been entrusted to them.  In the private use of reason, individuals behave 
“passively,” directed by the government “through an artificial unanimity” to advance or 
to defend certain stipulated ends.  While Kant argued that restrictions on the private use 
of reason in no way thwart the progress of enlightenment, he insisted that the public use 
of reason must remain free, since “it alone can bring about enlightenment among men.”67  
Kant’s use of the term “public” diverged markedly from established conventions 
in jurisprudence and instead embraced an emerging usage of the term that had been 
employed by the writers and publicists who published in journals like the Berlinische 
Monatsschrift. In this conception, “the public” referred to a reading public, those 
individuals with the inclination, the time, and the taste to read, discuss, and criticize the 
stream of books and journals that flooded the literary marketplace in the last half of the 
eighteenth century. In selecting a clergyman, a soldier, and a citizen [Bürger] as 
examples of individuals who are capable of making public use of their reason to address a 
reading public, Kant dramatically expanded the scope of those who could qualify as “men 
of learning [Gelehrte].” As John Christian Laursen has observed, “If soldiers, clergymen, 
and Bürger all qualify as Gelehrten, then hardly any official or male head of an urban 
household, which is to say hardly any full member of society by eighteenth-century 
standards, would not qualify.”68 
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Kant’s emphasis on the centrality of the public use of reason in his definition of 
enlightenment is consistent with the emphasis he placed on the ideal of “publicity” – the 
free and public exchange of ideas – in his political philosophy. It also is a testimony to 
one of the fundamental ideals of the broader European Enlightenment:  the notion that 
readers and writers, divided though they might be by national boundaries, were members 
of a single “Republic of Letters.”  Eighteenth-century Europe saw the emergence of a 
number of institutions – scientific academies, salons, coffeehouses, Masonic lodges, and 
an international book trade – that transcended the borders of the nation state and brought 
individuals into contact with one another.  Kant’s essays on the philosophy of history – 
from his 1783 contribution to the Berlinische Monatsschrift, “Idea for a Universal 
History with a Cosmopolitan Aim” to his examination, in The Conflict of the Faculties 
(17XX) of the question of whether it is possible to see evidence of a moral improvement 
of the human race in history – are animated by a hope that this cosmopolitan community 
of readers and writers might one day culminate in cosmopolitan political structures that 
would end what he viewed as humanity’s greatest scourge:  war.69 
While Kant’s is the most famous of responses to Zöllner’s request for a definition 
of enlightenment, there were a number of other important responses,  most notably, 
Moses Mendelssohn’s contribution, which appeared a few month’s before Kant’s in the 
Berlinische Monatsschrift.  Mendelssohn saw enlightenment as one aspect of a more 
inclusive process that he called Bildung – a term which defies translation and refers to the 
ideal of cultivating, forming, and educating fully developed individuals.  Enlightenment, 
in Mendelssohn’s view, was concerned with “theoretical matters,” that is, with “rational 
knowledge” and “rational reflection about matters of human life.” He contrasted it to 
Cultur [Culture], which he argued was “oriented towards practical matters” such as 
“goodness, refinement, and beauty.”  Thus, “Enlightenment is related to culture as theory 
to practice, as knowledge to ethics, as criticism to virtuosity.”  Ideally, both work 
together to advance the “destiny of man,” but there is no assurance that, in fact, there will 
not be discrepancies between them, producing either an excess of enlightenment that 
“weakens the moral sentiment, and leads to hard-heartedness, egoism, irreligion, and 
anarchy” or an excess of culture, which manifests itself in the production of “luxury, 
hypocrisy, weakness, superstition, and slavery.”  Even more troubling for Mendelssohn 
was the potential for conflicts between what he termed “the enlightenment of man as 
man” and the “enlightenment of man as citizen.”  The former proceeded without concern 
for the particular position that individuals held in society.  The latter, in contrast, 
“changes according to status and vocation.” While Kant held that there were never 
grounds for placing restrictions on the public use of reason, Mendelssohn maintained that 
it was possible for efforts aimed at the enlightenment of individuals “as men” to come 
into contact with the variegated forms of enlightenment that individuals required in their 
role as citizens.  Particularly pressing for Mendelssohn was the propreity of censorship, a 
topic that had been extensively debated within the Wednesday Society in conjuction with 
the discussion of Möhnsen’s lecture.  While Mendelssohn was opposed to governmental 
restrictions on the press, he nevertheless granted that too much, too rapid, or too reckless 
an enlightenment might wind up undermining the goals that it sought to achieve.70  He 
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was particularly troubled by the conduct of the French philosophes was particularly 
troubling for him. “Nothing is more opposed to the true good of mankind,” he insisted,  
“than this sham enlightenment, where everyone mouths a hackneyed wisdom, from 
which the spirit has already long vanished; where everyone ridicules prejudices, without 
distinguishing what is true in them from what is false.”71   
V. Toleration, Universalism, and Multiplicity 
The question of whether efforts at enlightenment must be limited in the name of 
preserving public order became even more pressing during the early years of the reign of 
Frederick William II.  Members of the Berlin Enlightenment had long viewed the new 
monarch, who was known to be inclined towards religious enthusiasm and mysticism, 
with concern. 73   Matters came to a head during the summer of 1788, when von Zedlitz 
was replaced as head of the Ecclesiastical Department by Johann Christoph Woellner, a 
long-time advisor of the new king who appears to have harbored an animus against both 
Frederick II and some of the more prominent figures in the Berlin Enlightenment. On 
July 9, 1788 Woellner issued an edict on religious questions, which included a sharp 
criticism of the Berlin clergy for reviving “the miserable, long refuted errors of the 
Socinians, deists, naturalists, and other sectarians” and disseminating them among the 
people in the name of “Aufklärung.” While allowing clergy, in their role as private 
citizens, to believe whatever they wished, the edict stipulated that, in their teaching, they 
adhere to the articles of the faiths in which they had been ordained.  Those “so-called 
enlighteners [Aufklärer]” who refused to conform were threatened with dismissal and 
future candidates for pastoral and teaching positions were to be carefully scrutinized so 
that there would be no doubts as to their “internal adherence to the creed they are 
employed to teach.” The intense criticism that greeted the edict prompted Woellner to 
issue new censorship regulations in December 1788 requiring that writings on religious 
matters be submitted to a special commission for scrutiny. 
The promulgation of Woellner’s edicts has usually been seen as marking the end 
of the Enlightenment in Prussia.74 More recently, however, Ian Hunter and Michael 
Sauter have suggested the controversy that greeted the edicts might better be seen as a 
consequence of differing interpretations of one of the most central concepts in the 
European Enlightenment: religious toleration.75 They argue that the edicts were, in many 
respects, simply a continuation of previous Prussian policies that were intended to 
maintain a civil peace between differing religious confessions. Thus, the first article of 
the Religion Edict stipulated that the three main Christian confessions (Reformed, 
Lutheran, and Catholic) “should be maintained and protected in their prior condition,” 
while the second article extended the same protections to such “previously publicly 
tolerated” sects as Judaism, the Herrnhutter, the Mennonites, and the Bohemian Brethren. 
The principal thrust of the Religion edict, according to Hunter and Sauter, was to reassert 
a conception of religious toleration that both prevented the state from imposing a 
particular religion on its citizens and sought to check attempts by individuals to disturb 
the religious liberty of others by engaging in efforts a proselytizing.  Thus, rather than 
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being an attack on “the Enlightenment,” per se, the Religion Edict might better be 
understood as one particular interpretation of what enlightenment demanded:  the 
preservation of a civil peace between diverging religious confessions.76 
The debate over Woellner’s edicts suggests that, by the end of the period we call 
“the Enlightenment,” there were a number of different ways in which the notion of 
toleration was understood.  One interpretation, quite close to the view that Sauter and 
Hunter associate with the Religion Edict, is vividly depicted in an allegorical 
representation of toleration dating from 1792 by the Prussian engraver Daniel Nikolaus 
Chodowiecki.77  At the center of the engraving stands a helmeted Minerva, with her arms 
outstretched, as if bestowing a blessing on the figures that surround her, who are clad in 
traditional dress of a multitude of different religions. The meaning of the allegory is clear 
enough:  it is only under the protection of reason that the various different religious 
confessions can live together in peace.  The engraving also includes a vivid reminder that 
the means by which the protection is assured rests on something more than simply the 
light of reason that streams out from behind her: there is also a large lance leaning against 
her left shoulder.  In the engraving, the members of the differing religious confessions 
appear to be carrying on their customary practices with no apparent alternation.  
Toleration alters nothing in the content of their beliefs; its mission is confined to 
maintaining pacific relations between the different faiths. 
A markedly different vision of what toleration implies can be found in a letter that 
Moses Mendelssohn received from his friend August Hennings in the spring of 1782.  
Hennings argued that those who sought to advance the cause of toleration must work to 
ensure the spread of the principles and doctrines that “sound reason” demonstrated as 
common to all religions.  Only in this way, he maintained, could the “poison of 
partisanship” that separated mankind into different religious confessions be overcome 
and “universal enlightenment” be achieved.  While the beliefs of those representatives of 
the various religious confessions who gathered around Minerva in Chodowiecki’s 
engraving remain unchanged, Hennings was convinced that peaceful relationships 
between religions could be achieved only if it was possible “to unite everyone in the 
worship of the one true God.” Hence the question that this admirer of Voltaire posed to 
Mendelssohn: “What need do we have for Judaism or Christianity?” Would not toleration 
be better served through the spread of a universal religion, based on reason alone, that 
could draw adherents from all faiths? 78 
The question would have been all-too familiar for Mendelssohn, who had spent 
his life responding to requests – both well-intentioned and not so well-intentioned – to 
renounce Judaism in favor of one or another version of a rationalized Christian faith. The 
peculiar interest that Spalding and other members of the Berlin Enlightenment had in 
Mendelssohn’s conversion can be traced to millenarian traditions that persisted even 
among enlightened Christians: the conversion of Jews to Christian faith was, in many 
quarters, still viewed as a sign that would serve as a confirmation that Christianity had, 
indeed, reformed itself to the point where it might, at last, become a “unitarian” faith, 
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embracing all reasonable men of good will.79  Mendelssohn, as the most famous 
enlightened Jew in Europe, was an obvious candidate for conversion.   
Mendelssohn closed Jerusalem, his treatise on religion and civil power, with a 
discussion of religious toleration that called Henning’s vision into question. 
A unity of faiths [Glaubensvereinigung] is not tolerance … let us not 
feign agreement where multiplicity [Mannigfaltigkeit] is the evident 
plan and purpose of Providence. None of us thinks and feels exactly 
like his fellow man; why then do we wish to deceive each other with 
delusive words? … Why should we make ourselves unrecognizable to 
each other in the most important concerns of our life by masquerading, 
since God has stamped everyone, not without reason, with his own 
physiognomy? Does this not amount to doing our very best to resist 
Providence, to frustrate — if it is possible — the purpose of creation, to 
oppose our vocation [Beruf], our destiny [Bestimmung], in this world 
and the next?80 
Mendelssohn’s defense of religious diversity was based on a long-standing conviction 
that the ultimate purpose of nature was “unity,” but not “uniformity.” As he observed in a 
letter from 1777,  
I hold that unity [Einheit] is indeed to be distinguished from uniformity 
[Einerleiheit]. The latter negates multiplicity, the former brings it into 
connection [Verbindung]. Uniformity stands opposed to multiplicity; 
unity, however, is all the greater the more multiplicity is linked together 
and, indeed, the more intimately this is done.  When this linkage of 
multiplicity takes place harmoniously, unity passes into a perfection 
which uniformity cannot endure.81 
When applied to the question of the relationship between differing faiths, this notion 
implies that the goal of toleration would be to foster ties between different religions that 
would affirm the truths that united them while still preserving the particular identities of 
individual faiths. 
 There is a powerful invocation of this vision in Lessing’s play Nathan der Weise, 
a work that is both one of the era’s most important explorations of the theme of religious 
toleration and a touching personal tribute:  Lessing modeled the figure of Nathan on his 
friend Mendelssohn.  Set in twelfth-century Jerusalem, during a time of uneasy peace 
between Christians, Jews, and Muslims, the play wrestles with issues that remain all-too 
current.  At one of the more significant turning-points in the play, Nathan – a wealthy 
merchant who finds himself under threat of persecution from the fanatical Patriarch of the 
Catholic church in Jerusalem (a figure modeled on Lessing’s own nemesis, Johann 
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Melchoir Goeze, the chief pastor of Hanover) – reveals to a Christian Friar who has been 
his long-time friend that, long ago, his family had been slaughtered by Christian 
crusaders and, in his anguish, he had sworn an irreconcilable hatred against all Christians.  
Three days later, the Friar, then a young monk living in the desert, placed in his care an 
infant girl whose Christian parents had also been killed in the conflicts that wracked the 
region.  The Friar’s gesture, Nathan explains, reconciled him both with the God and man.  
At this point, the Friar exclaims,  “O Nathan, Nathan, You’re a Christian soul! By God, a 
better Christian never lived!” To which Nathan replies, “And well for us! For what makes 
me for you a Christian, makes yourself for me a Jew!”82 
 The Friar’s well-tended, but somewhat tactless, characterization of Nathan as “a 
Christian soul” might well serve as a symbol of the empty “universalism” for which the 
Enlightenment is often criticized.  It has been claimed that harsh light of reason, while 
allegedly neutral, carries a bias:  it is inherently blind to difference.  But the words that 
Lessing gave Nathan remind us that there were other strains within the Enlightenment 
that had a more subtle understanding of the nature of toleration: a recognition that what 
binds individuals together is not the recognition that others are just like them, but rather 
the more complex relationship in which we realize that the very traits that allows others 
to see themselves in us, also allows us to find ourselves in others. In the two centuries 
that separate us from the Enlightenment, it has become clearer how difficult this task may 
be. But little in that history suggests a better alternative.   
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